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Abstract 
The theoretical 3-level model used to analyse the Open Method of Coordination belongs to a “rational” view 
of the international cooperation. Although considered to be a far too simplistic framework to be able to accurately 
describe a highly complex phenomenon, it does justice to the idea that actors have predetermined preferences in 
specific areas and they systematically act in order to achieve those priorities within the constraints of an institutional 
system.  
According to this hypothesis, the OMC has been analysed by breaking the process down into three stages (i.e. 
the influence of the internal structure, the intergovernmental negotiation model and the institutional choice). Detailed 
theories have been used to describe each stage (e.g. neoliberalism, neorealism, neofunctionalism, institutionalism), but 
also  abiding  by  the  overall  rational  context.  In  conclusion,  these  elements  will  be  amassed  in  order  to  create  a 
comprehensive explanation of this complex phenomenon.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Definitions and Concepts 
International cooperation has been defined in the study of world politics as an unbridgeable gap between the 
Real Politik and its vision of the national interest as a null sum game and the neoliberal perspective which aimed to 
study the phenomenon of state cooperation. In a multidimensional approach to world politics – devised by Robert 
Keohane – a series of central statements pertaining to the structural realism are modified and ordered in a research  
program which states that: 
  A clear priority is given to the state actors, but the role of the intergovernmental organizations and non-state 
actors cannot be overlooked;  
  The main actors on the political stage – the states – are characterized by rationality, as they tend to maximize 
their benefits in a vast array of objectives, which are ordered logically; 
  The interests of the state are defined by power and influence, but these elements are not forever unchanged; in 
different systems, states will define their interests differently [1]. 
 
In this context, cooperation is seen as a “process through which the politics implemented by governments are 
seen by their partners as ways of facilitating their own objectives, as a result of coordination at a policy-making level” 
[2]. Thus, the cooperation / coordination pair gains a new dimension, that of inter-statal collaboration, which emerges 
not from a natural tendency to harmonise interests, but from a state of conflict or potential conflict. To be able to talk 
about cooperation, each state must look to the changes operated by its partner state and consider them beneficial to their 
own interests. Facilitating the ideological and methodological transactions in this neoliberal system of international 
cooperation is vouched by the existence of international institutions – i.e. organizations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties 
and agreements – that constrict the activity and shape the expectations of the actors.  
 
  1.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism. A model by  Andrew Moravcsik.  
  Within this theoretical framework, the Open Method of Coordination – OMC as an instrument of 
European policy-making will be analysed. OMC  debuted in the field of employment in 1997 and extended to the areas 
of social inclusion, pensions, health and healthcare, education, environment, immigration and asylum granting once it 
became an official instrument of the Lisbon Strategy  [3], in 2000. In order to perform an in-depth analysis of OMC, 
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the 3 step model of the “liberal intergovernmentalism”, developed by Andrew Moravscik will be used, as it underlines 
the importance of power and preferences of the EU member states in the process of European policy-making. This 
model highlights a gradual process of convergence of the preferences belonging to some of the more powerful states, 
who then sign agreements between themselves, offering compensations to much smaller states and delegating strictly 
limited powers to the super-national organizations. Consequently, there are three steps to developing European policies: 
  Setting  national  preferences  according  to  the  liberal  theory,  meaning  these  preferences  are  shaped 
internally and are determined by particular factors, which are specific to each individual state, e.g. economy, 
the political environment and its institutions; 
  The intergovernmental stage of negotiation, in which the negotiation “power” reflects the relative power of 
a  state,  given  that  super-national  organizations,  like  the  Commission,  have  but  little  influence  on  the 
outcomes;  
  The  institutional  choice  –  the  role  of  international  institutions  in  providing  solid  commitments  to 
national  governments,  which  means  that  member  states  delegate  sovereignty  to  super-national  actors  to 
increase the credibility of their common commitments and to diminish the tendency to abstain from fulfilling g 
those commitments.   
 
1.3 The Open Method of Coordination 
Next, this model will be used to analyse the OMC, a new method of coordinating the national policies of the 
EU member states, which can be launched at the state’s initiative or at the initiative of the Commission  and which 
entails the collective setting of objectives and indicators in a designated field, through which member states, based on 
national  reports,  can  improve  their  area  of  knowledge,  can  develop  channels  for  an  exchange  of  information, 
perspectives, experience and practices and can promote innovative approaches that can be transformed into guidelines 
and recommendations.  
Therefore, the Open Method of Coordination represents a process through which the EU member states agree 
to coordinate their policies through a process of mutual learning and structured exchange of information; through the 
OMC, the member states agree on common goals, use common indicators, and prepare national strategic reports that 
can define future guidelines for public policies and evaluate each other, while the Commission is limited to monitoring 
using a series of common monitoring reports which will deal with the performance levels achieved by member states; 
depending on the areas in which OMS operates, it implies soft law measures, which do impose on states, but which can 
never be translated into normative European acts (directives, regulations, decisions).   
Consequently, the Open Method of Coordination is bordering both the super-national and inter-governmental 
mechanisms. It can also be viewed as a translation of the theoretical debate between the neorealism and neoliberalism 
parties at an European level: member states do not yet want a common legislation (so there is a conflict or a potential 
conflict) in a certain area, but they nevertheless have the political will to make progress together (i.e. states have 
collaboration problems – meaning how to transform their behavior and the behavior of their partners in order to achieve 
optimum results).  
 
2. OMC analysis  
2.1 Shaping the national interest internally  
The first step in Moravicsik’s model rejects the idea that national preferences are shaped by taking part in the 
European Union. That is to say, the structure doesn’t determine the behavior of the actors, but it is the actors who 
determine the structure. Therefore, heads of government collect the interests of their internal electors and combine them 
with their own interests, which are dictated by the specific political and economic conditions, and present them as 
national preferences to the EU. The OMC reflects this process by its ability to involve all interested parties in the 
decision making process as it relates to the public policy, by directly involving citizens and civil society structures, 
which only selves to increase transparency and democratic commitment. As a result, OMC offers social actors the 
opportunity to have their priorities known at a European level.   
It  is  obvious  that  this  first  step  is  an  oversimplification  of  the  way  states  delineate  their  interests  as  it 
minimizes the influence of the super-national and international structures.  Moravicsik himself does not totally exclude 
the impact an interconnected set of rules and practices has on shaping the expectations and behavior of the actors.  For 
example,  the  idea  of  transparency  is  inherit  to  the  OMC  system,  as  it  facilitates  the  comparative  evaluation  of 
performance and the mutual learning process. In order for the OMC to work, it is important that all actors involved, 
both national and European, to have access to all information and documents throughout the process. To avoid making 
the OMC process a purely technocratic one, it is necessary to make a permanent effort to increase the quality of the 
public communication, so that vast categories of citizens and local NGOs can be able to follow and take part in all the 
stages of the process. Moreover, OMC offers the opportunity to partake in the process, but it does not automatically 
ensure it. Often, consulting the internal structure is but an option for governments and not a right or a principle of good 
governing. Therefore, the formal or informal practices that states accept as being constrictive at a super-national level 
can play an important part at a national level. 
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2.2 The intergovernmental negotiation model   
In the second stage of the OMC analysis, the negotiation table in Brussels is replaced by deliberating and 
common learning processes, which go above a forced harmonization and pays homage to diversity in areas marked by a 
difficult operating legal framework. The Open Method of Coordination is innovative and decentralized and involves a 
tight intergovernmental organization. The increased role of the European Council – a significant intergovernmental 
aspect of the European Union – played in the different stages of the policy coordination process represents an extra 
guarantee for an effective collaboration. Moreover, the deliberating process of the OMC is cyclical and centered on 
resolving  the  problem  identified  in  a  common  manner,  with  the  goal  of  learning  by  evaluating  the  compared 
performances.  
However,  in  order  for  this  process  to  take  place,  a  political  will  based  on  objective  national  interests  is 
necessary. Based on Stanley Hoffman’s hypothesis on the primacy of the state [4], intergovernmentalists have stated 
that the negotiating techniques employed by the EU are streamlined tactics pertaining to intergovernmental diplomacy 
which  highlight  the  power  and  preferences  of  the  EU  member  states.  Coordinating  these  preferences  does  not 
automatically entail a concession made to cooperation and the integrative aims. According to the idea that cooperation 
in a super-national context works until the national interest is affected, detractors of the OMC have expressed their 
concern that using OMC as a substitute for the stronger legal instruments that operate within the EU would lead to 
states having a hard time respecting the more binding commitments. As a result, the tough negotiation rounds between 
member  states  in  a  super-national  context  foreseen  by  could  intensify  as  the  influence  of  a  legally  weakened 
Commission decreases. Therefore, even in a multilateral commitment, the states are worried about the differences in 
estimated gains, which often impede cooperation.  
 
2.3 The institutional choice  
As  shown  above,  the  role  of  institutions  is  not  completely  discredited,  as  they  are  given  a  position  of 
monitoring,  evaluation  and  consulting.  Although  there  is  a  tendency  to  view  international  institutions  as  the 
“watchdogs” of established commitments, they do have a certain influence on the behavior of the actors, setting up a 
context governed by principles, norms, regulations and procedures which are accepted by participating states and which 
govern the interactions of various actors in various areas of interest. Such an influence can be seen in an international 
institution like the European Union both  in  the vertical  and horizontal plan of developing interactions. In such a 
context, the OMC is a good example. Annually, member states must present the European Commission with a report on 
the progress they’ve made achieving their set goals and with the list of priorities for the upcoming period.  Once every 
3  years,  more substantial reports  must be presented based on all the areas covered by the OMC. Monitoring  the 
progress is done through a 3-level system: primary and secondary levels deal with common indicators for all member 
states; the tertiary level deals with the indicators used for each individual country, depending on the national specific 
and conditions of internal politics – these indicators are set by the countries themselves.  
The political monitoring is done at the highest level, as the European Council plays an important role both in 
the goal-setting and monitoring stages. In turn, the European Parliament gains through the Lisbon Treaty a higher 
consultancy role, as the member states are required to inform this forum of the guidelines and indicators they set, of the 
exchange  of  best  practices,  of  the  periodical  monitoring  and  the  evaluation  reports.  Moreover,  the  Method’s 
transparency attribute highlights the fact that the involvement of a vast array of actors in the OMC processes  at all 
levels is essential in order to ensure different perspectives are taken into account, to access local experience and to 
condition the public authorities to respect their commitments to achieve the common goals of the EU.  
Therefore, the delegation of power – which was limited in Moravcsik’s view –  to international organizations 
allows states to form a credible commitment to the promises they made to each other, by monitoring and following up 
on their agreements and clarifying any lingering issues derived from the latter.  
 
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
The theoretical 3-level model used to analyse the Open Method of Coordination belongs to a “rational” view 
of the international cooperation. Although considered to be a far too simplistic framework to be able to accurately 
describe  a  highly  complex  phenomenon,  it  does  justice  to  the  idea  that  actors  have  predetermined  preferences  in 
specific areas and they systematically act in order to achieve those priorities within the constraints of an institutional 
system.  
According to this hypothesis, the OMC has been analysed by breaking the process down into three stages (i.e. 
the influence of the internal structure, the intergovernmental negotiation model and the institutional choice). Detailed 
theories have been used to describe each stage (e.g. neoliberalism, neorealism, neofunctionalism, institutionalism), but 
also abiding by the overall rational context.  
Consequently, the analysis of the Open Method of Coordination from the perspective of Andrew Moravcsik’s 
liberal intergovernmentalism has highlighted a series of advantages and a certain amount of limitations of using such a 
method in developing European policies. Although the soft aspects of the OMC come with disadvantages such as 
problems with involvement, the social-economic situation, the position of the member states in relation with the EU 
cooperation etc., OMC also has the advantage of being a useful, effective and flexible instrument of policy-making. 
Because OMC encourages the convergence of national objectives, performance and a constructive approach to the 
process of policy making compared with the rigid system of predetermined institutions, rules and programmes, this 
mechanism is useful in identifying and underlining common interests of the member states in the context of their won 
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autonomy and diversity. OMC is not only a method of super-national governance or an intergovernmental one but an 
instrument that operates on many levels, promoting the collaboration between states. Consequently, one can state that 
the primary objective of the OMC is to increase the effectiveness of the policy coordination in sensitive areas where 
there are no strong regulating instruments such as the European regulations. OMC has the potential to achieve this 
objective of the efficient coordination and to prove itself a good instrument to operate based on  the principle of 
subsidiarity, of applying a good governance, of increasing the coherence of the inter- and intra- sectorial collaboration, 
as long as the states keep steady in expressing their political will to implement the collaborative process and are aware 
of the limitations of the OMC.  
 
 
4. Resources 
 
[1]  Andrei  Miroiu  /  Radu-Sebastian  Ungureanu  –  Manual  de  Relaţii  Internaţionale,  Edit. 
Polirom, Iaşi, 2006 
 
[2]  De  Burca,  Grainne  /  Zeitlin  Jonathan  –  Constitutionalising  the  Open  Method  of 
Coordination,  http://ceps.be/book/constitutionalising-open-method-coordination-what-should-
convention-propose 
 
[3] Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok - Facing the challenge, The Lisbon 
Strategy for growth and employment,  http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf 
 
[4] Hellen Wallace, William Wallace & Mark A. Pollack – Elaborarea politicilor în Uniunea 
Europeană, Ediţa a 5-a, Institutul European din Romania, Bucureşti, 2005 
 
 
 
179